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Introduction

*
The global economic and financial crisis, which broke out in 2008, had a significant impact on European countries and, consequently, on its fiscal and budgetary decisions in the various policy areas. Security and Defence were no exception. Despite the fact that the international security context continues to require a proper response to a set of transnational and sub-national risks and threatsincluding regional instability, namely in the broader Middle East and North Africa; arms and nuclear proliferation; cyber-attacks; various extremist and terrorist movements; organised crime and human trafficking; and potential natural disasters -, the European countries decided to adapt their budgets to an environment of economic crisis, namely by applying austerity measures to its defence structures.
With decreasing resources but the same (or even growing) needs, all European countries were forced to think on how to obtain better results at any level of spending -personnel, investment and operations/maintenance -and reducing the impact of major expenditure cuts. This trend has been pursued at two levels: at the national level, most European countries started a process of adjustments and reforms within the defence structure aiming at more efficient organizational arrangements; at the European level, through the promotion of a better cooperation between countries, namely regarding common projects (including force generation and investment), both at the NATO and European Union (EU) level. As an example of this international cooperation, the Atlantic Alliance started a comprehensive debate on a new way of thinking about generating modern defence capabilities, the socalled 'smart defence' concept, with the aim of encouraging Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities. The same as been done within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), namely through the promotion of the 'pooling and sharing' concept in the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework. Most EU countries, notably those who are also NATO's members, must now look for the best way of profiting from the cooperation's mechanisms within the two organizations, in a logic of complementarity and aiming to improve its operational response, particularly in international missions.
Since 2010, real defence spending in Europe has declined at a compound annual growth rate of 1.9%, with reductions of 3.0% in 2011, 2.2% in 2012 and 2.4% in 2013. Overall, real defencespending levels were 7.4% lower than in 2010 1 . Despite this general trend, at the national level, the evolution of defence budgets is different across Europe, in three major trends. The first corresponds to the countries that increased its military spending. Only ten out of 37 European states increased their defence expenditures, including Poland (14.8%) -which is seeking to increase the number of the country's deployable troops and to become an even more active participant, particularly in the NATO's framework -Bulgaria (10.2%) Norway (9.1%) and Turkey (5.4%) 2 .
A second trend concerns to the three major spenders in Western Europe -the UK, France and Germany -that have made small reductions in military spending since 2008, in each case by less than 5% in real terms. However, in 2010, the UK presented its Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 3 and planned to reduce its defence budget by 7.5% over four years, although in practice the cuts may have been deeper. Germany has planned to cut around 10% in its military expenditure by * This paper follows a previous contribution to the LSE Ideas Special Report on "A Strategy for Southern Europe" (October 2013), with a revised version and updated data after 2013. 1 2015 (compared to 2011). And France, which presented its White Paper on Defence in 2013 4 , is planning to maintain roughly constant spending in real terms.
Finally, a third trend corresponds to the Southern European countries, which have made the largest cuts and significantly reduced their defence budgets since the beginning of the crisis, with particular large decreases in Greece (-42%), Spain (-19.6%) and Italy (-15.8%) 5 .
Nevertheless the budgetary constraints, the EU-28 member-states are still one of the largest defence spenders in the world. Even if most European countries spent -prior to the economic crisisless than 2% of their GDP on defence 6 .
Defence spending in Southern Europe
In the context of the Euro crisis, the Southern European countries are among the most badly affected. They faced, first, serious sovereign debt problems in the wake of the banking crisis and a long period of economic recession. Like Ireland, Portugal and Greece were forced to ask for international financial assistance. Spain and Italy were not formally obliged to apply for it, but all four Southern European countries face very similar problems: high deficits, rising debts and deep economic recessions. To fulfil the terms of the bailouts, or simply to restore the markets' confidence, all these countries adopted fiscal consolidation policies as the first priority and approved harsh austerity measures. We should recall that all NATO members are committed in spending, at least, 2% of their GDP in military expenditure.
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The investment dimension of national defence budgets includes not only new equipment procurement and R&D expenditure, but also the modernization processes of equipment already in use. , with emphasis on the stake that the country has in EADS one of the aircraft global leading companies 11 . These means that any major cut in military investment projects in Italy and Spain will have direct effects on their national economies and, consequently, will aggravate the domestic economic crisis environment. Although all Southern European countries have made cuts in every area of military spending, this could explain why the Spanish and Italian governments would choose to cut, primarily, on personnel and operations/maintenance rather than on investment programmes, whereas Portugal and Greece 12 could find major cuts, with a transversal scope, across all defence expenditure.
This also means that these countries have different approaches regarding international cooperation in defence industrial initiatives. Italy and Spain can use their industrial basis to participate and lead transnational cooperation projects, either in EU and NATO's framework, while Portugal and Greece are limited to potential expertise niches. These differences, that support some of the political choices made in the framework the budgetary constraints, may also be important in defining each country's international strategies in security and defence issues.
Portugal
Since 2005, and across the crisis, Portugal shows relatively constant military spending of around 2,500 million euros. Between 2008 and 2010 Defence expenditure grows, even slightly, up to nearly 2,700 million euros, which meant a total of 1.6% of the GDP. Since then, however, and under the strong pressure of austerity policies, the military expenditure decreased from 2699 million euros in 2011 to 2366 million euros in 2012, which represents 1.4% of the GDP 13 .These cuts had immediate consequences and, in the framework of the so-called 'reform of the State' process, the Portuguese government launched a new reform of the Defence and Armed Forces.
Regarding personnel, in 2003 (when Portugal changed from a military system based on conscription to a professional army) Portuguese Armed Forces had already been substantially reduced. In 2010 the number stood at 38,000 troops across the three branches of the Armed Forces. However, the personnel expenditure still represents 74% of the total defence expenditures in 2013
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. In order to optimise the defence budget structure, the on-going reform 15 , taking into account the established level of ambition, points to a reduction of about 8,000 troops and a total number for the Armed Forces of about 30,000 military. (Contd.) companies (available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/production/Top100) Italy has 7 companies among the top 100 arms producing corporations in the world: Finmeccanica (8), Agusta Westland (24), Alenia Aeronatica (49), Fincantieri (63), Selex Galileo (75), MBDA Italia (90) and Avio (93).
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Finmeccanica is one of the largest industrial and high-tech group in Italy, the 8th major defence company in the world and the third in the European Union (after the British BAE Systems and the European consortium EADS). 10 Concerning investment, there is also a clear decreasing path: from 364 million euros in 2009 to 255 Million euros in 2012. This meant a fall from 14% to around 11% of the total military expenditure. But the trend is getting worse. In the following years, in order that the Ministry of Defence would meet, both, the budget targets and the financial commitments with arm suppliers, it was forced to find a solution to the on-going military modernization programs: to postpone payments to arm suppliers; and freeze or suspend some programs, some of which were already underway, like those of NH90 helicopters and the PANDUR II 8/8 armoured vehicles.
Finally, the cuts have also negative effects at the operational level, namely in the participation of the Portuguese Armed Forces in international peacekeeping missions. Although with slight fluctuations, the decreasing tendency of overseas deployment is similar to other Southern European countries. In 2008 Portugal had a total of about 700 troops abroad, which in 2012 have been reduced to about 468. In 2012, the withdrawal from UNIFIL (Lebanon) and the reduction of about 50% in ISAF (Afghanistan) 
Italy
The economic and financial crisis had a direct impact on the Italian defence expenditures. SIPRI Concerning investment, this rationalization proposal included the postponement of some procurement programmes. As an example of the decrease in investment projects, Italy as decided to reduce its planned order for F-35 fighter jets, considered one of the world's costliest defence project, from 131 to 90 aircrafts 24 , although the country is still the second largest EU partner in this transatlantic programme, after the UK. Other major multinational procurement programmesincluding Eurofighter, NH90 and FREMM -have not yet been reviewed 25 .
Regarding international missions, Italy has tried to maintain its commitments intact so far. It maintained an average commitment of 6,700 military in peacekeeping operations in [2010] [2011] [2012] 
Greece
Greece was the second-biggest defence spender among the 27 NATO countries, after the United States. It had also one of the highest 'military burden' in the EU, until 2011 more than 2% of its GDP, with a military budget in 2012 of 3,272 million euros (compared with 6,200 million euros in 2008). Greece's particular geostrategic context contributed to this fact. With long-running tensions with Turkey 27 (nevertheless the relations between the two countries have improved in recent years), Greece has a strategic position in the Mediterranean -with an extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the need to control thousands of islands and porous borders regarding illegal immigration and organised crime -, as well as the need to promote stability in the Balkans, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
The Greek defence budget for 2012 showed a 16% fall in nominal terms, compared with the previous year, with further cuts planned in coming years as part of the austerity package 28 . Since the beginning of the crisis, Greece had decreased its military expenditure in around 40%.
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Regarding personnel, the Armed Forces were also being restructured. The definition of cuts on personnel started with the approval, in the end of 2003 30 , of the new force structure for the 2005-2020, predicting a reduction in military from 178,500 to 142,000, mainly in the Army. Although, the definition of the force structure was reviewed every five years and major cuts were made in the number of troops, being from 133,700 in 2008 to 109,070 in 2012. More than 70% of Greek budget is devoted for personnel costs alone. Furthermore, military and civilian personnel account around 2.5% 27 Namely the Aegean Sea disputes (a complex of maritime, air, territorial and boundary disputes) and the conflict According to this brief analysis, since 2008 there is a widespread cut in Southern European countries' military spending, which mainly results from the economic crisis environment and the implementation of national austerity policies. This decrease implies not only a reduction in manpower, but also a decline in the investment -with consequences on the modernization and acquisition of new military capabilities -and a restraint in the participation in international peacekeeping missions.
Since this trend is not likely to be changed in a short term, and may even be aggravated, it can be expected consequences at two levels. At the national level, a more careful definition of the Security and Defence policy's priorities regarding strategic objectives and international cooperation, either in terms of force generation and investment projects. At the international level, a more limited disposal from the southern European countries to assume international military commitments within the organizations in which they participate (namely UN, NATO and EU), with obvious consequences to their role as international security providers.
Way out? Permanent structured cooperation or sub-regional defence cooperation
Despite national particularities, the four southern European countries under austerity policies show similar trends regarding the Defence and Armed Forces sector.
The first trend is the decline in Defence expenditure. With the exception of Portugal, all other southern European countries have reduced their defence expenditure, in real terms, in the last five years. Second, there is an overall reduction in manpower, both civilian and military. Although there is an international trend for a reduction in manpower -resulting, among other reasons, from technological change, adjustment and modernization of the force structure and private sector contracting -, this tendency in the Southern European countries results, mainly, from economic crisis. A third trend is the decrease of investment, procurement and R&D. All Southern European countries froze or suspended some of their military modernization programmes, although with differences between the countries whose defence industries have an important impact on national economies (Italy and Spain) and the others (Portugal and Greece). Finally, there is a reduction of military peacekeeping deployments. All Southern European countries have decreased the number of troops in international missions, which had consequences on these countries contribution to international operations, both at NATO and EU level, also reducing their role as international security providers.
The economic crisis, the austerity, the reduction of military expenditure and the downgrading of the political priority given to Defence can only be overcome by taking the context of crisis as an opportunity. And if this is true for the European Union as an all, is even truer for Southern Europe.
That could be done at two levels. At the national level, through the promotion of structural reforms of the Defence and Armed Forces that allow to maintain the same level of ambition, but with optimizing resources. In other words, doing more with less. This would mean an improvement of the ratio between support and operational military, a rationalization of the resources available and a more balanced budgetary structure, reducing personnel cost and increasing investment, R&D and operations/maintenance expenditure. The major objective should be more deployable Armed Forces, capable to respond to the current security and defence environment.
But the current economic and financial crisis should also constitute an opportunity to deepen the Defence cooperation between EU member-states.
